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This paper analyses how the myth of the individual 
architect as a subject of innovation is an abstract ma-
chinery for capturing the work of other architects. To 
do that, it develops a historical regressive analysis on 
how innovation is actually produced, and the limits 
in which it is bounded. Furthermore, it analyses the 
role of narratives in the interpellation of architectural 
subjects, and how it defines a position from which 
subjects can act politically in the field. By doing so, 
it unveils the mechanisms behind the architectural 
black boxes (the office and the prince chronicles). In 
order to provide a new political role for architecture, 
it builds a different conception of the subject that 
produces these projects, exploiting the idea of trans-
subjectivity in architecture. 
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Dead subjects of innovation
In 2012, when Oscar Niemeyer died at the age of 105, 
he was still ‘designing’ a vast number of buildings 
around the world. A few days after his funeral, his 
grandson, the architectural director at Niemeyer’s 
office, declared that the firm would finish the projects 
already started, setting an end to 78 years of archi-
tectural practice, even if one could not measure the 
size of Niemeyer’s contribution towards the end of his 
life. Nevertheless, Niemeyer remained very talkative 
and engaging in his lectures, always surrounded by 
admirers astonished by his unceasing commitment to 
designing. As expected, Niemeyer left a foundation to 
protect the image of his architectural legacy, even if 
his grandchildren were left in a fierce legal battle over 
his heritage.
The death of Zaha Hadid, in early 2016, led to a very 
different turn of events. At the time, Zaha Hadid 
Architects (ZHA) had offices in London, Beijing and 
Hong Kong. These offices had already developed 
more than 950 projects, and the firm was about to 
open a new office in New York, with additional plans 
for offices in Dubai and Mexico. Some weeks after 
Hadid’s death, finding the world of architecture in 
mourning, Patrik Schumacher, who had become a 
partner at ZHA in 2002, declared to the NY Times 
that ZHA would continue designing (Erlanger, 2016). 
According to Schumacher, Hadid had set a precedent; 
she had imbued the practice of architecture with 
a ‘new repertoire’ and a new ‘spirit’. On this basis, 
he could ensure that the firm’s 400 staff members 
could confidently continue her vision and research 
(Erlanger, 2016). In Schumacher’s words, thus lives 
Zaha Hadid:
any star in architecture has been born in the discipline itself, 
and emerges through schools, competitions and colleagues. 
(…) We want to tell the world that we’re still a viable, vibrant 
address for major work of cultural importance. (…) My 
ambition is to become more visible as a leader of the field to 
clients (…) This star signature is a relatively new phenome-
non (…) We feel very confident that we will carry on and go 
forward with her vision and her legacy and the experimental 
research she established in the office (Patrik Schumaker in 
Erlanger, 2016).
A few days after 
his funeral, his 
grandson, declared 
that the firm would 
finish the projects 
already started.
59Camilo Vladimir de Lima Amaral
The magic produced by these architects seems now 
not to even require them to be alive. This remarkable 
phenomenon may be pointing, on the one hand, to 
the fact that the concrete individual is not the actu-
al innovative force behind architecture and, on the 
other hand, to the emergence of a phantasmagorical 
era in architecture (an era of dead architects). Thus, 
some new issues inevitably arise: would it be possible 
for a well-trained and highly tuned team to continue 
not only the legacy but also the innovation associated 
with a dead architect? And more radically, could we, 
for instance, resuscitate Le Corbusier?
Obviously dead people cannot design, those paradox-
ical questions have the purpose to reveal that these 
individuals – entrepreneurs, star architects, and 
alike – were never the creative force behind archi-
tecture. Instead, they are operative images capturing 
collective work as if it was done by a single person. 
These images are built by the discipline’s ideology – 
narratives, historiographies, biographies, myths, and 
so on. The critical point is that these images become 
instruments of power – distinctions in the words of 
Bourdieu 1996 – setting some architects in the control 
of the work of others.
In other words, the argument of this paper could be 
synthetized as follows: the myth of the architect as an 
enlightened genius is a form of abstract machinery for 
harvesting symbolic distinction in the field, which in 
turn is used for capturing the work of other architects. 
This leads us to some further questions: who is the 
subject of architectural production and which is the 
limits of his innovation? And are individuals required 
to envision social agency?
Mariana Mazzucato (2011) has recently attacked the 
myths of individual ingenuity as the motor behind 
innovation. Most notably, she debunked the myth 
that the iPhone was the product of the ‘vision’ of 
Steve Jobs, exposing how iPhone’s major innovations 
have come from state-funded research, i.e., they have 
been collectively produced. Then, such innovations 
have simply been appropriated by companies and 
produced by thousands of workers overseas. In this 
sense, Mazzucato’s argument reinforces the idea 
that production is the result of a social and collective 
process – a ‘general social knowledge’ in the words of 
Karl Marx (no date [1857]).
The magic 
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Arguably, recognizing and exposing the collective 
nature of architectural production is a way of sub-
verting the relations of power operating behind 
design production. This is the case because the field 
of architectural labour is today structured by these 
individualistic myths. All over the world, young archi-
tect, students and interns, are enchanted, seduced and 
attracted by these mythological images, and they are 
working virtually free for them. Arguably, to under-
stand architectural innovation as collective rather 
than individual includes changes in the very meaning 
and purpose of architectural work. 
Rather than working for mythological figures, the 
meaning of architectural practice becomes the struc-
turing of collective subjects able to transform social 
space – it is worth mentioning that these collective 
subjects might include more than just architects. In 
this sense, to think on collective subjects does not 
eliminate the agency of single subjects, as they have a 
role in articulating social knowledge and structuring 
collectivities. What vanishes is the phantasmagorical 
genius.
And rather than reproducing narratives, biographies 
and the mythological power of entrepreneurs, the 
purpose of architectural theory becomes a social 
critique able to unveil the forces and power relations 
operating behind the production of space. It goes 
without saying, that is not the expected social role of 
design – it is a subversion of it – and that opens excit-
ing fields of research.
If we can understand the mechanisms behind the 
collective production of innovation, we might be able 
to envision collective subjects producing any architec-
tural innovation – be it technical, formal, aesthetical, 
methodological or applied creativity. The first step, in 
order to do that, is to notice that the idea of innova-
tion has a history of its own, which can give us some 
clues.
Benoît Godin (2015; 2017) has a long research on 
the intellectual history of the concept. Although his 
research concerns mainly the different uses, context 
and meaning of the word, without trying to find a 
definition of its own, it provides important insights 
in the matter. He demonstrates how the idea changed 
between negative and positive connotations. Godin 
(2010; 2014: 7) asserts that the word innovation (in + 
The idea of 
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novare) became widely used in the 16th and 17th centu-
ry context of Reformation. In that context innovation 
had a pejorative connotation and it was used to ac-
cuse others of attacking the church doctrine. Later, he 
argues, the connection between socialism and inno-
vation was first done by its critics, rather than by its 
followers, whereas “Social innovation is not foreign to 
the idea of social reform, under a new name.” (Godin, 
2017: 8). In this sense, he argues that just recently 
‘technological innovation’ came to refer positively to 
capitalism, while ‘social innovation’ became positively 
related to a socialist point of view (Godin, 2017: 4). 
Godin (2015: 58) also notice how the idea of innova-
tion was also used in Machiavelli’s seminal work The 
Prince as a tool to ‘stabilize a changing world’ (we 
shall return to the idea of the prince later). 
If we take this broader history in mind, and the idea 
that in legal terms the word novation means the 
substitution of a new contract in place of an old one, 
we can make sense of the role that innovation has 
in contemporary context. The prefix in has a double 
use: it can mean a negation (as in inorganic) or it can 
mean an intensification (as in inland or incarnation). 
Arguably this sets a realm of operation to the idea 
of innovation, which could be both understood as 
not creating a new contract, and at the same time as 
intensifying and reshuffling the arrangements inside 
an old contract – especially if we focus on the realm of 
‘social contracts’. The history, that Godin presents us, 
shows how the controversies around the term innova-
tion in the 17th Century were disputes inside the realm 
of Christianism, not representing threats of elimina-
tion to the Church. Similarly, the use by Machiavelli 
was not contesting the institution of the ‘principality’; 
rather, it aimed to ensure those systems could endure.
Among the many meaning of the word innovation, 
Godin (2008) studied from simplifications that equates 
newness with innovation to ‘linear models’ that places 
innovation in between pure science and the market. 
Subliminal to these discussions is rather individuals 
are imperious to envision or act upon the future. The 
standpoint of this paper is radically different. It does 
not conceive the subject as equal to the individual. 
Subjects are both under certain social rules (subjected 
to it) and operating in a certain way on it (within and/
or against it). Individuals is a peculiar conception of 
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subjects, conceiving it as autonomous atoms. ‘In-divid-
uals’ presupposes a subject at the same time not fur-
ther divisible (essential) and divided/separated from 
larger assemblies (such as society and communities). 
Alternatively, this paper investigates subjectivities 
operating inside what would be perceived as individ-
ual subjects.
In this sense, these “individual” subjects are seen as a 
structured amalgam of contradictory pre-individuali-
ties (we shall discuss this further below). In this sense, 
individuals have neither the monopoly of agency – the 
ability to produce social change – neither the control 
of it – as long as they are not even aware of the forces 
operating behind their subjectivities. In this sense, 
this paper argues that in order to provide a practical 
and theoretical gateway towards an intensified social 
novation (in-novation as intensification) we need to 
confront the idea of individual subjects producing 
innovation. Thus, this paper is thought as a guide for 
that: a deconstruction of individual architects’ phan-
tasmagorias.
Regressions in the assembly line of invention
Jobs did not invent the abstract machinery for ex-
propriating inventions as described by Mazzucato. 
Thomas Edison is perhaps the most iconic modern 
‘inventor’ and has been systematically depicted in 
schools and by the media as the genius behind the 
invention of such things as the ‘light bulb’. Neverthe-
less, a series of studies of the actual means by which 
the inventions (commonly attributed to Edison) were 
produced shows a different picture. In the early days 
of the Thomas Edison laboratory in West Orange, he 
was employing more than 200 scientists, craftsmen, la-
bourers and machinists. When the laboratory expand-
ed and became associated with a factory complex, 
the number of employees jumped to 5000, and today 
General Electric employs more than 300,000 people 
(Padgett, 2016). At the beginning, these men were 
paid only ‘working man’s wage’; however, the famous 
inventor reportedly said that – in exchange for their 
ambition – his employees were given the opportuni-
ty to work side-by-side with a genius (Bellis, 2016). 
However, how much of the lab’s creative labour came 
from Edison and how much came from his workers?
Carlson (1988) has studied the process by which the 
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alkaline storage battery was invented. He argues that 
during the course of this invention, Thomas Edison 
developed a new way to produce inventions. Previ-
ously, Edison would work with mechanics and crafts-
men in a relatively loose way, wherein those workers 
would investigate diverse aspects of an invention, and 
eventually Edison would step in ‘only at the appro-
priate moment’ to ‘pull together the various discov-
eries and improvements into a successful invention’. 
Later, in Edison’s laboratory, large groups of chemists, 
engineers and college-educated scientists would work 
on experiments focused on very specific goals, in a 
systematic, step-by-step arrangement of assignments. 
In shifting from a ‘divergent’ to a ‘convergent’ style, 
Edison became a manager who oversaw the project, a 
role that left him time to focus on strategies of produc-
tivity and commercialisation (for instance, he partici-
pated in the association that developed ‘programmed 
obsolescence’). However, the ‘most important’ role 
now played by Edison was to ‘motivate his research 
team’, using ‘decidedly informal’ techniques of ‘mo-
tivating and directing’ through his ‘use of a personal, 
folksy style [that] may well have been deliberate’ 
(Carlson, 1988: 10-11).
Although this convergent approach produced highly reliable 
results, it came at the cost of requiring over 50,000 individual 
experiments. Furthermore, Edison had thoroughly routin-
ized the innovation process. By breaking down the research 
into a sequence of small, standardized experiments, Edison 
had altered the creative process from hands-on ingenuity 
and skilled observation to persistence and careful re-
cord-keeping. Gone were the last vestiges of the ‘heroic’ myth 
of invention in which insight came in a blinding flash; results 
now came by plodding through innumerable experiments 
(Carlson, 1988: 6).
Invention became an ‘orderly’, ‘predictable’ process, 
making Edison’s ‘large staff and substantial facilities’ 
an advantage to beat competitors, which in turn made 
‘the innovation process a reliable component of busi-
ness strategy’ (Carlson, 1988: 11). For these reasons, 
his friend Henry Ford reportedly said, ‘Mr. Edison 
gave America just what was needed at that moment in 
history. They say that when people think of me, they 
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assembly line which brought together the genius of 
invention, science, and industry’ (quoted in Newton, 
1987: 31).
In addition to developing this abstract assembly line 
to expropriate the work of others, Thomas Edison 
cultivated his fame through vast investments in mar-
keting and especially through the legal mechanism of 
patents. Edison alone is credited with the invention 
of 1,093 patents (Simonton et al., 2015). Lemley (2011) 
investigated how the conception of a sole inventor – 
which is implied in patent law – is a myth, as inven-
tions come from progressive collective work and are 
therefore frequently produced simultaneously by 
independent groups, as “Inventors build on the work 
of those who came before, and new ideas are often ‘in 
the air’ ”. Thus, a patent is also a means of privatising 
the work of others.
In these terms, the same critique Marx applied to the 
fetish of the commodity (used by capitalists to alienate 
products from workers in industrial assembly lines) 
can be applied to the fetish of the invention (used by 
the ‘genius’ to alienate the creative work of a collec-
tive).
There are some remarkable examples in architecture. 
For instance, although Tafuri and Dal Co (Tafuri, Dal 
Co, 1976: 140) noted that Frank Lloyd Wright made 
the decisive shift towards what would become his fa-
mous style by using all his wife’s fortune in The Broa-
dacre City project, he fails to address how this project 
was produced. With that capital, Wright created the 
‘Taliesin Fellowship’ (a messianic school in the middle 
of the desert). With this means he appropriated the 
work of a series of collaborators and apprentices as 
his own (for a vast number of previously unpublished 
interviews, documents and evidence of that, see Fried-
land, Zellman, 2007). Wright’s style is the product of a 
collective that was appropriated by him. Better said, 
appropriated by his myth of genius. If Broadacre City 
brought him close to bankruptcy, it also made him 
a ‘symbol’ of US architecture. This was not uninten-
tional. In his lectures, he was very clear in the aim to 
become the icon for the style of a US civilisation to be 
spread around the world. Architecture was a means 
to capture and to reproduce collective subjectivities. 
Therefore, the point is not to recognise that Broadacre 
City project is a reflex of the American society (a sat-
The same critique 
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ellite image is enough to reveal how the grid and the 
arrangement of nature and urban interventions is just 
a mimesis of the Taliesin local scenario in an univer-
sal image). The point is to understand how his myth 
further reproduce the subjectivity of other architects.
In our own society of spectacle and immaterial toil, 
the architectural office – once an elite’s stronghold di-
viding intellectual and manual work – is now becom-
ing a new sweatshop. In this sense, Bjarke Ingels gives 
a first-hand account of what it was like to work in 
Rem Koolhaas’s office (Parker, 2012). The only way to 
rise in rank at OMA was by acquiring ‘more and more 
sorrows’, by creating ‘space for designers beneath me 
in responsibility to crank out cool stuff’. Ingels recalls 
episodes of yelling and ‘hurling of office supplies’ and 
that designers were under constant tension and stress 
due to negative reinforcement. At some point, he felt 
he ‘had paid [his] dues’ and decided to open his own 
office. What was his alternative? To create his own 
sweatshop, employing dozens of architects, using up-
to-date behaviourist techniques: rather than ‘negative’ 
he uses ‘positive’ reinforcement (a more tender way 
of dressage). This disciplining transforms architectur-
al work into a form of subjectification (production of 
subjectivities).
Abstract machines to capture innovation
Arguably, the movement known as ‘Autonomism’ has 
investigated production through a renewed analysis 
of Marx’s (no date [1857]) account of the ‘general 
intellect’ in the ‘Fragments on Machines’, a part of 
his notes called the Grundrisse. There, Marx propos-
es that the actual force of production is the general 
knowledge that results from society’s functioning 
as a whole. Nevertheless, he argues, this knowledge 
is increasingly objectified into machines (a process 
he also calls thingfication, or reification), which, in 
turn, function as devices to capture more of society’s 
collective productive forces. Thus, machines function 
as means of control and expropriation: ‘In machin-
ery, knowledge appears as alien, external to him [the 
labourer]; and living labour [appears as] subsumed 
under self-activating objectified labour’ (Marx, no 
date [1857]: 695). This passage in Marx has been very 
fruitful for contemporary critical theory because it 
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science and technological development occurs under 
the development of mechanisms to frame and capture 
social work.
For Paolo Virno (2001), the dialectical nature of Marx’s 
materialism reveals how the material conditions of 
production are objectified abstract scientific knowl-
edge fixed into capital (one could say ‘past labour’ 
fixed into machines), thus revealing an ‘inter-subjec-
tive foundation’ in any labour praxis. In contempo-
rary context, Virno asserts that the mass intellectuali-
ty that is not objectified in machines is later captured 
by a mass control of communication and sharing, 
thus further controlling living labour. Additionally, a 
politics of affects and cynicism makes possible a wide-
spread pseudo-solidarity with those suffering, and at 
the same time it becomes the basis of ferocious forms 
of competition. As Jason Reads puts it: ‘Competition is 
a paradoxical form of individuation in that it produc-
es individuals who are all the more alike’ (Read, 2010: 
130).
For Lazzarato (2014: 31), this radically changes the 
search for a subject of history, as this condition is nei-
ther a worldview nor a lack of consciousness but rath-
er a mechanistic entanglement of the parts involved. 
In this realm, there are no individual subjects being 
dominated (as in personal enslavement), rather, there 
is diagrammatic management of a whole community 
of workers.
In addition, David Harvey (2010: 40) stretches the 
emphases of Marx’s Capital into the ‘roles’ people play 
in the market system. In this system, social relations 
are presented as an exchange of things (Harvey, 2010: 
41). In addition, even if one might have ethical and 
moral principles when dealing with people face-to-
face, when buying a commodity in the market, these 
relations appear as relations between things (com-
modity-money) and therefore as inevitable facts. For 
instance, at the moment you buy bread, you are rein-
forcing the system just as your own retirement fund 
is managing assets in the global market. That creates 
an unavoidable condition, Harvey (2010: 47) argues, 
which imposes specific ‘roles’ because ‘the characters 
who appear on the economic stage are merely person-
ifications of economic relations’. Therefore, people 
will, even unwillingly, become ‘the bearers’ of capi-
talistic social relations. In this sense, it is not a matter 
the dialectical 
nature of Marx’s 
materialism 
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of a ‘bad’ architect enslaving another but rather of a 
whole field of practice working as a collective appa-
ratus reifying subjectivities, in order to create new 
objects that are nothing more than bearers of fetish 
(social relations objectified in commodities).
Thus, Marx’s fragment on machines – and his consid-
erations of the production of social relations in the 
form of fetishism – led many authors to investigate 
how subjectivity is produced in contemporary society 
rather than to investigate how subjects could free 
themselves towards a supposed true nature (Guattari, 
1995; Lazzarato, 2014; Read, 2010; Spencer, 2012).
For Jason Read (2010: 155), the expression ‘production 
of subjectivity’ has a double meaning: as something 
‘productive’ and as something ‘produced’. Subjectivity 
is historically produced by multiple processes of in-
dividualisation in physical, biological, collective, psy-
chic, linguistic, and cultural sensibilities and through 
power struggles. At the same time, it is productive of 
social relations that impact the possibilities of action 
in society. Read rescues this idea from Marx’s Capital:
the special productive power of the combined working day, 
is under all circumstances, the social productive power of 
labour, or the productive power of social labour. This power 
arises from cooperation itself. When the worker co-operates 
in a planned way with others, he strips off the fetters of his 
individuality, and develops the capabilities of this species 
(Marx, 1990: 447).
For Read, subjects are always subjects in a collective, 
therefore, a differentially articulated part of a whole. 
Therefore, subjects are individuations of a metastable 
field of trans-individuality. This means that subjectiv-
ity is formed by a priori elements (language, culture, 
structure, social expectations, and so on) ‘externalised 
in machines and internalised in concepts, habits, and 
ways of thinking’ (Read, 2010: 118-119). The political 
problem emerges because these machines operate not 
as atoms but transversally, capturing the collective 
intellect formed by society.
In the contemporary mode of production, there are 
many examples of such processes. The biggest new 
businesses are only abstract machineries, platforms 
that capture not only the labour of others but also 
their everyday lifestyle. Today, Facebook is the biggest 
Today, Facebook 
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platform of information sharing, which it does with-
out producing any content, only capturing a series of 
‘interconnected’ users gladly producing content as a 
form of leisure, without recognising it as production. 
Uber might be considered the biggest transportation 
company in our ‘smart’ times; without owning or 
maintaining any vehicles, it transfers all the risks of 
the business to its workers while it also exploits the 
socially produced infrastructure of the city without 
paying taxes for it. Similarly, Airbnb offers the world’s 
largest variety of lodging, without owning any of the 
properties, through the creation of a new subjectivity 
of ‘trendy travellers’ and ‘kind hostesses’ based on 
people gladly providing undervalued goods and/or 
services in exchange for a ‘social experience’.
However, the fundamental question here is how does 
this fetish come to inhabit our very own abstract ma-
chines of design production?
The office, or the black box of architecture
Latour and Woolgar (1986) investigated how abstrac-
tions would acquire life when they were reified into 
technical apparatuses. When scientists use an appara-
tus to ‘discover new phenomena’, what they see on the 
other side of the ‘black box’ of the apparatus is framed 
by the past theories and hypothesis that produced that 
‘black box’. Thus, he argues, the phenomena these sci-
entists see only existed through the mediation of the 
machine, and the machine only exists because of the 
past labour reified on it (the theories inscribed in this 
material basis) (Latour, Woolgar, 1986: 64).
He uses Bachelard’s idea that these scientific appara-
tuses of ‘reified theories’ are phenomenon-techniques, 
and thus explaining how they operate as ‘black boxes’: 
‘When another member handles the NMR spectrom-
eter (…) to check the purity of his compounds, he is 
utilising spin theory and the outcome of some twenty 
years of basic physics research’ (Latour, Woolgar, 
1986: 66). The ideas inscribed and configured on the 
machine were based on arguments and theories, and 
these were the results of discussions at conferences 
and disputes in journals and articles, until they were 
finally accepted as ‘facts’. Thus, the ‘so-called material 
elements of the laboratory are based upon the reified 
outcomes of past controversies’ (Latour, Woolgar, 
1986: 87).
The fundamental 
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To create a theory of photography, Vilém Flusser 
(1985) developed a “philosophy of the black box”. 
Flusser (1985: 40) argued that it is the photographic 
camera that performs the operation of transforming 
reality into codified signals of visual communication, 
and the photographer is manoeuvred by the few 
potentialities inscribed in the apparatus. Therefore, 
the photographer actually looks inside the apparatus 
rather than outside, thus “revealing” rather than cre-
ating. However, for Cabral Filho and Baltazar (Cabral 
Filho, Baltazar, 2010), analysing Flusser’s theory in 
the realm of art and technology, it is not a matter of 
destroying the ‘magic’ of the black box or of making 
its devices predicable and dull but rather of opening 
its internal mechanisms for potential interactivity. 
A music box has interactivity, but only in the form 
of repetition; a piano does not reveal its content but 
allows creation and interactivity. Yet, in the same way 
as a photographic camera, it does so within a framed 
realm of possibilities. The challenge is to open the 
inner realms of the devices for interactivity if the goal 
is to create new possibilities.
In the field of architecture, the emergence of appa-
ratuses such as CAD, renderers, and 3D software are 
increasingly ‘entailing’ the production of architecture, 
in the same sense that a refrigerator ‘entails’ a power 
source (to use an example from Taylor, 2010: 44), thus 
transforming architects into operators of machined 
global systems capitalised by companies providing 
access to this content.
Furthermore, one could agree with Mark Cousins (AA 
School of Architecture, 2016) that whereas previously 
the artist had a symbiotic relation with the ‘brush’, 
and the architect with the ‘pencil’, today the ultimate 
apparatus of architectural production is the ‘office’, 
which enables a ‘genius’ to seduce followers and 
to channel the work of a legion of workers. With a 
high-profile office, an architect can expropriate the 
work of hundreds of others. However, this abstract 
machinery only works if architects desire to be part 
of it.
Deleuze has famously asked: how do people come to 
desire their own exploitation? For Slavoj Žižek (2014), 
the answer of what we desire lies in fantasies: the nar-
ratives a subject creates to build a logical chain of cau-
salities that assures our desires as unconditional. And 
It is not a matter 
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that is why to deconstruct the mythology of individual 
innovation in architecture matters.
The reproduction of individuals by narratives
Clearly, a complete analysis of the evolution of the 
epistemology of historical narrative is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it is essential to un-
derline the internal contradictions of different modes 
of architectural valorisation. In addition, and more 
fundamentally, this analysis might underline how a 
narrative of the evolution of the discipline is related 
to a specific form of imagining the development of 
architecture and the contribution of architects seen as 
individuals.
There is a long-standing dichotomy in historical 
narratives between a “chronicle of the princes” and a 
“history of the masses” (Rancière, 1994). For Rancière, 
there is a poetical struggle in the production of his-
tory, where those in positions of power aim to make 
history the result of their own actions, thus silencing 
the concrete history experienced by others.
It is in this sense that Kracauer (1995: 101-106) argues 
biography to be the ‘Art Form of the New Bourgeoi-
sie’. For him, the novel of the 19th century, in which 
individuals were immersed in an overall context, was 
being replaced by (and condensed in) the history of 
highly visible heroes. As the ‘actual life’ of individu-
als gives a sense of ‘certainty’ to historical veracity. 
Biographies sounds as narratives ‘based on true facts’, 
so these facts become crystallised, and history seems 
to be the ultimate result of individual actions. For Kra-
cauer, this is the ultimate form of ‘evasion’ from the 
masses and the collective character of history.
In this sense, the fundamental problem of the idea of 
‘agency’ is the assumption of an ‘autonomous’ subject, 
acting with free will, even if surrounded by a (neutral) 
structure. Nonetheless, to move beyond the concept of 
agency does not aim to deny the possibility of action; 
rather, it aims to engage in how subjectivities and 
social structures frame possible choices, condition 
alternatives, foment drives, and induce behaviours by 
expectation; and, furthermore, to engage in how sub-
jects are (from the start) subjected to a past that goes 
beyond individuals. As we saw, the ‘biography’ genre 
became fundamental for the individualistic subject of 
capitalist society. Beneath that, the architectural imag-
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ination is trapped in a deeper conception of history 
based in the chronicles of ‘princes’ and ‘princesses’.
Arguably, the notion of a ‘prince’ directing history 
was first systematised in Machiavelli’s (2008) book 
The Prince (originally written in 1513). According to 
Althusser (2000), Machiavelli’s ultimate goal with the 
‘prince’ was to create an ‘intellectual dispositive’ to in-
form political practice. He was specifically concerned 
with fortuna, the circumstances or conjectures that a 
prince would have to face to ‘command and act’. The 
prince was a device thought to act ‘negatively’ and 
‘objectively’ to control the randomness of the future. 
For Althusser, this negative objectivity was what Ma-
chiavelli conceived as virtù.
Machiavelli (cf. Althusser, 2000) was not inventing 
the figure of the prince per se. He was systematising 
a traditional practice in its purest form (as an ideal, 
a prince as a re-presentation). So, he deduced the 
representational character of the prince as an im-
age, and specifically as a public image. This image, 
then, could support a figurative narrative of political 
developments and international affairs. The inter-
actions among social conditions (fortuna) are then 
ideologically manipulated by means of the image of 
the ‘prince’, which aims to capture social drives and 
expectations to build a new (logical) chain of necessity 
in the form of a new linear narrative (virtù). In this 
sense, the prince is an operative image (a device) that 
manipulates social drives to achieve specific goals. For 
instance, in the case of Machiavelli, the goal was the 
unification of Italy, and a new virtuous prince should 
emerge in order to articulate this social transforma-
tion (in this sense, his prince was a re-presentation 
of a complex context, different forces and different 
interests that could mobilise and direct the action of a 
collective subject – the entire country).
Thus, a prince is an operative public image of a polit-
ical narrative; it is an image of power or truth rather 
than power or truth itself. By the means of this intel-
lectual operation, the ‘prince’ becomes ‘the subject’ 
of history, and the majority of theories and histories 
of architecture are arguably based on ‘architectural 
princes’.
This theoretical framework is also useful to under-
stand why certain kinds of individuals rarely enters 
these narratives – as for instance minorities and 
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women – as traditional institutions reproduce social 
prejudices. In misogynistic and male chauvinist soci-
eties, the images used to reproduce social power are 
male figures. It is not the case that the role of women 
and minorities are less important to architectural 
development, it is the case that they are strategically 
set aside in a supporting role – i.e. these narratives 
are also a form of institutionalizing and establishing 
systems of power. 
In this sense, although much research, including Ta-
furi’s approach, has made great advancements in con-
textualising architecture in a social context, scholars 
have ultimately reinforced the abstract device of the 
‘prince’ because their critique was centred on repre-
sentations (mainly male white architects) conducting 
the evolution of architectural history. As Jodi Dean 
asserts, this is precisely the problem:
Not only is agency privileged over structure but the pre-
sumption that agents are individuals formats the alternative 
of autonomy or subjugation as an opposition between indi-
vidual and collective. Collectivity comes to be associated with 
constraint, with preventing rather than enabling creativity 
and initiative. Liberal political theorists explicitly construe 
political agency as an individual capacity; others take the 
individuality of the subject of politics for granted. I argue 
that the problem of the subject is a problem of this persistent 
individual form, a form that encloses collective political 
subjectivity into the singular figure of the individual (Dean, 
2014: 364).
For a Subversion of How We See Subjects of Architec-
tural Innovation
Althusser (1971: 5) argued that ‘The ultimate condi-
tion of production is therefore the reproduction of the 
conditions of production’. For him this reproduction 
is based on ideology, which he conceived as the image 
an individual has of his place in the world (Althusser, 
1971: 165). This image places the subject in a specific 
relation to the world, and in a position from which 
this subject can act in the world. For Althusser, this 
image is created through ideological apparatuses 
(material-immaterial objects such as advertisement, 
books, institutions, or buildings) that positions the 
individual in a set of expected relations, reinforcing 
existing beliefs. Those apparatuses are, therefore, ob-
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jectified social relations that frames the subjects. But, 
Jodi Dean (2014) inverts Althusser’s famous formula 
by saying that it is not the case that ideology inter-
pellates the individual as subject, rather, capitalism 
interpellates subjects as individuals. 
Simondon (2013) builds his approach not on the basis 
of the individual but on the basis of the process of 
individuation. The error, he argues, resides in giving 
to the atom already-individualised a status of prin-
ciple, i.e., in presupposing the individual already 
individuated as an essence, instead of looking for how 
and from where this individual came from. Simon-
don’s (2013: 24-25) effort is to conceptualise being as 
becoming, to acknowledge the individual by means of 
its actual process of becoming – its concrete opera-
tion of individuation – and not the opposite way. In 
this sense, being is not seen as substance, nor matter, 
nor form but as a system in a precarious state of (not 
fully) resolved tensions and in a continuous process of 
transformation.
There are two views according to which the reality of being 
as individual can be approached: a substantialist view, 
considering being as consisting in its unity, giving to itself, 
founded upon itself, not generated, resistant to what is not it-
self; and a hylemorphistic view, considering the individual as 
generated by the encounter of form and matter. But in those 
two views there is something in common (…) Departing from 
the created individual, the effort [of these views] is to reach 
back to the conditions of its existence (…) it considers the 
individual, as long as constituted individual, the reality to be 
explained (…) Such a perspective of research gives ontolog-
ical privilege to the constituted individual. Thus, it risks not 
approaching a truthful ontogenesis, of not positioning the 
individual inside the system of reality in which the individu-
ation is produced (Simondon, 2013: 23, our translation).
Alternatively, an ontogenesis considers becoming as 
a dimension of being, thus relations can receive the 
status of beings (such as relations between interi-
or and exterior), without naming any new obscure 
substance. In the case of becoming as a dimension of 
the living being, the individual reveals a continuous 
‘theatre of individuations’ (Simondon, 2013: 29). As we 
are always absorbing and purging matter, the living 
individual is the one who continuously re-enacts the 
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operation of its becoming/individuation in a continu-
ous exchange between inside and outside.
An individualisation is always also collective because 
the individual is just a provisional actualisation of a 
shared field of pre-individualities, thus it is formed 
of internal ‘disparations’. In this sense, the subject is 
a mediation (a resolution/structuration) of disparate 
social subjectivities. This collective dimension of 
individuality is what Simondon calls the transindi-
vidual. In the case of the individuation of the subject 
of architectural innovation, one could argue that an 
architect is never just an isolated genius. She/he is the 
mediation of a broader and diverse subjectivity, the 
general intellect of his profession.
Although the concept of trans-subjectivity enables the 
understanding of the emergence of transformation, 
the theory of Simondon does not advance in the poli-
tics behind these transformations: the struggle for the 
emergence of new subjectivities. Arguably, the first 
step for that would be to subvert the abstract machin-
ery reproduced by the discipline of architecture in 
order to recognize the collective force behind archi-
tectural production.
Conclusions
As we saw, dead architects should not be able to inno-
vate – they are dead! – and yet they seem to be doing 
it! The reason why we are entering this era of phan-
tasmagorical architects is the intensification of these 
images of individuals (the operative work of the ideo-
logical image of these star architects, princes, prin-
cesses, and so on). That is why we are entangled in a 
politics of subjectivity: the way we narrate and see the 
innovation process of architecture sets a framework 
of power relations. 
This paper started with this paradox, in order to 
reveal how current understanding of architectural 
innovation limits the role of architects and reproduc-
es specific sets of power relations. As the investigation 
goes back regressively into the abstract machinery of 
invention, it is made clearer that the image of the ge-
nius is an apparatus that captures a collective ‘general 
intellect’. Nowadays, in architecture this machinery is 
mainly framed through The Office. As a black box, The 
Office stablishes a set of reified social relations and it 
is operational because architects believe in the narra-
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tives and biographies of geniality it entails. 
The deconstruction of how these disciplined narra-
tives limits the understanding of architecture is the 
first step to subvert the understanding of architecture 
as an individual agency. Thus, to build awareness on 
the collective processes that moves architecture in-
novation is the second step to subvert the way we see 
and act as subjects of architecture.
That allows a new field of research and practice as it 
repositions architecture’s relation to the world: on the 
one hand, we can see how black boxes are controlling 
what architecture can do, and on the other hand, we 
can see how architecture operates in the reproduc-
tion of social subjectivities through the reification of 
social relations into space (something perhaps as old 
as Leon Battista Alberti’s book titled De Re Aedifica-
toria, which literally means ‘the thing building’, i.e. 
spatial thingfication or the production of spatial black 
boxes). In addition, this small guide also allows us to 
see a new transversal position from which architects 
can act in the world – namely, through the articulation 
of collective subjects. To see the possibility of social 
change mediated by collective subjects of architecture 
is, in itself, a subverted form of social innovation.
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